

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 03266 01 OF 02 101636Z

45

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 EURE-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SS-15 RSC-01 PRS-01

CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 TRSE-00 NEA-10

ACDA-19 EB-11 OMB-01 RSR-01 /116 W

----- 042711

P 101505Z JUL 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 761

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

USCINCEUR

ALL NATO CAPITALS 3115

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 3266

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT MBFR: AN ALLIANCE PROGRAM FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

HELSINKI FOR USDEL CSCE

BEGIN SUMMARY: THIS PAPER SETS FORTH MISSION VIEWS ON HOW THE ALLIES SHOULD PREPARE A COMMON NEGOTIATING POSITION ON MBFR. WE PROPOSE THAT THE ALLIES CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS BETWEEN NOW AND THE OPENING OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS ON A PAPER, ENTITLED "ALLIANCE PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR," WHICH WOULD CONTAIN THREE SECTIONS: 1. BASIC GUIDELINES; 2. INITIAL ALLIED NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL; 3. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. OUR SUGGESTIONS ON THE GENERAL CONTENT OF THESE SECTIONS ARE ALSO INCLUDED. OUR PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS ARE THAT:

--THE ALLIES' INITIAL PROPOSAL IN VIENNA FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS BE BASED ON OPTION II IN THE U.S. "APPROACH TO MBFR" PAPER, PARITY THROUGH ONE-SIXTH REDUCTION IN U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES

--THIS INITIAL PROPOSAL CONTAIN TO BRIEF STATEMENT
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03266 01 OF 02 101636Z

ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THEIR MIGHT BE FURTHER REDUCTION PHASES, BUT INSISTING ON A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS

-- ALLIED DIFFERENCE ON SUBSEQUENT PHASES BE DISCUSSED

IN THE SECTION ON NEGOTIATING STRATEGY AND NOT IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE INITIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

--THE ALLIES REFRAIN FROM PRESENTING ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSAL
ON ADDITIONAL REDUCTION PHASES UNTIL AFTER NEGOTIATIONS ON THE
FIRST PHASE

END SUMMARY

1. THE COPENHAGEN MINISTERIAL MEETING GAVE HIGH-LEVEL IMPETUS
TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN "ALLIANCE PROGRAM FOR THE FORTHCOMING
NEGOTIATIONS" ON MBFR. THE ALLIES WILL NOW LOOK TO THE U.S. IN
THE COUNCIL TO SET THE PACE AND PROVIDE DIRECTION FOR THE PREPA-
RATION OF A FINAL NEGOTIATING POSITION.

2. IN OUR VIEW, THE FIRST STEP WHICH THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE IN
NATO IS TO PRESENT AN EARLY DRAFT OF THE BASIC PAPER WHICH WE
BELIEVE THE ALLIES SHOULD PREPARE FOR THEIR NEGOTIATORS IN MBFR
TALKS. PROMPT PRESENTATION, HOPEFULLY BY MID-JULY, WOULD GET
THE ALLIES TO FOCUS QUICKLY ON THE FRAMEWORK OF A FINAL NEGOTIATING
POSITION AND AVOID PROTRACTED FURTHER DEBATE ON THE MBFR GUIDE-
LINES PAPER. EVEN ON OUTLINE AT THE TIME COULD SERVE THIS
PURPOSE, IF A FULL TEXT CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE UNTIL LATER IN
JULY.

3. THE TIME FACTOR IS CRUCIAL, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE
FORTHCOMING SUMMER BREAK, IF THE ALLIES ARE TO COMPLETE A BASIC
PAPER BEFORE THE OPENING OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. TO HELP MEET THIS
DEADLINE, THE U.S. DRAFT SHOULD BE AS BRIEF AND COMPREHENSIBLE
AS POSSIBLE. AS SUGGESTED BELOW, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PAPER
SHOULD:

--RETAIN THE EXISTING MBFR GUIDELINES PAPER AND NOT INTRO-
DUCE NEW OBJECTIVES AND GUIDELINES;

--FOCUS ON THE INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITION FOR THE FIRST
PHASE OF REDUCTIONS AND NOT ATTEMPT AT THIS STAGE TO GET ALLIED
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03266 01 OF 02 101636Z

AGREEMENT TO SPECIFIC REDUCTION PROPOSALS FOR SUBSEQUENT
PHASES;

-- DRAW UPON AN OPTION (WE SUGGEST OPTION II) TO WHICH THE
ALLIES HAVE ALREADY GIVEN STUDY.

4. ALSO TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATION ON AN INITIAL
NEGOTIATING POSITION, THE MISSION HAS RECOMMENDED TREATING IN A
SEPARATE CONTEXT POLICY TOWARDS COORDINATION AMONG THE ALLIES
(USNATO 3039).

5. OUR VIEWS FOLLOW BELOW ON THE BASIS CONTENT OF EACH SECTION
OF A THREE-PART PAPER ENTITLED "ALLIANCE PROGRAM FOR NEGOTIATIONS
ON MBFR."

PART I: BASIC GUIDELINES:

6. THIS SECTION WOULD CONTAIN THE GUIDELINES WHICH WILL PROVIDE BASIC OBJECTIVES AND PRECEPTS TO ALLIED NEGOTIATORS. THESE GUIDELINES WILL REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL, FOR ALLIED USE ONLY, AND WILL PROVIDE THE YARDSTICK AGAINST WHICH THE ALLIES' NEGOTIATORS CAN MEASURE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.

7. WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE INITIAL U.S. DRAFT THIS SECTION SHOULD CONSIST ONLY OF THE TEXT OF THE CURRENT MBFR GUIDELINES PAPER. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE UPON THIS PAPER AND TO ELABORATE ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES FURTHER. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THE POSSIBLE SUBSTANTIVE GAIN WOULD BE WORTH THE TIME REQUIRED TO HAVE A NEW ROUND OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON THESE GUIDELINES. ALTHOUGH THE PRESENT PAPER CONTAINS NUMEROUS BRACKETED SECTIONS, IT ALSO REFLECTS AGREEMENT ON A NUMBER OF USEFUL POINTS. A NEW SET OF GUIDELINES MIGHT EVEN RUN THE RISK OF UNDOING AGREEMENTS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN REACHED.

8. IN INTRODUCING THIS SECTION, WE WOULD INFORM THE ALLIES THAT WE ARE INCLUDING THE GUIDELINES AS A USEFUL STATEMENT OF THE ALLIES BASIC CONCEPT OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR GENERAL POSITION AGAINST WHICH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS SHOULD BE MEASURED. WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT THERE BE NO FURTHER DISCUSSION ON THE BRACKETED PORTIONS OF THE GUIDELINES PAPER UNTIL THE ALLIES HAD REACHED CONSENSUS ON THEIR INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS. THEY MIGHT THEN REVIEW THE GUIDELINES IN LIGHT OF DISCUSSIONS ON
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 03266 01 OF 02 101636Z

THEIR INITIAL PROPOSAL, TO SEE IF SOME BRACKETS COULD BE REMOVED.

PART II: INITIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

9. THIS SECTION WOULD EVENTUALLY CONTAIN THE TEXT OF THE ALLIES INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS. FOR THE PURPOSE OF GETTING ALLIED CONSULTATIONS UNDERWAY, HOWEVER, THE U.S. PAPER IN JULY NEED CONTAIN ONLY THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THIS PROPOSAL AND NOT A FINAL TEXT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. SUBMISSION COULD PARALLEL THE FORMAT OF THE OPTIONS DESCRIBED IN ANNEX A OF THE U.S. PAPER OF APRIL 30, ADAPTED FOR PRESENTATION TO WARSAW PACT NEGOTIATORS (E.G., THROUGH THE DELETION OF SPECIFIC FIGURES). THE MISSION COULD THUS INTRODUCE THIS NOT AS A FINAL U.S. TEXT, BUT AS THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A PROPOSAL ON WHICH WE WOULD REQUEST ALLIED VIEWS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 03266 02 OF 02 101705Z

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ACDA-19 EB-11 OMB-01 RSR-01 /116 W

----- 042864

P R 101500Z JUL 73

FM US MISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 762

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

USCINCEUR

ALL NATO CAPITALS 3116

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 3266

10. THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC SUGGESTION FOR AN INITIAL PROPOSAL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY VARIOUS ALLIES, WHILE CAPITALIZING ON THE FACT THAT NEARLY ALL ALLIES HAVE AGREED (ALBEIT WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM) THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE IN U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY.

A. FIRST REDUCTION PHASE: THE ALLIES' INITIAL PROPOSAL FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE BASED UPON OPTION II OF THE U.S. APRIL 30 PAPER. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOW ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT DIFFERENCES ON CONSTRAINTS, NON-CIRCUMVENTION, VERIFICATION, ETC., IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS OPTION.

B. ADDITIONAL PHASES: THE ALLIES WOULD NOT TABLE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS. THEY WOULD INSTEAD INCLUDE IN THEIR INITIAL PROPOSAL A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT: (1) THEY PREFER A PHASED, STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS OF REDUCTIONS; (2) MBFR SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED AND IMPLEMENTED IN A CONTROLLED AND CALCULABLE PROCESS WITH LIMITED OBJECTIVES AND ACCEPTABLE RESULTS; AND (3) THEY DO NOT PLAN TO INTRODUCE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR SUBSEQUENT PHASES UNTIL NEGOTIATIONS ARE COMPLETE ON THE FIRST PHASE.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 03266 02 OF 02 101705Z

THEY COULD COMMENT ORALLY, HOWEVER, THAT THEY HAVE DIFFERENT POSSIBLE PROPOSALS UNDER STUDY FOR A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OR PHASES, AND, BEFORE SIGNING AN AGREEMENT ON THE FIRST PHASE, MAY BE WILLING TO

AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT SUBSEQUENT PHASES WILL FOLLOW. (THIS PROCEDUR

FOLLOWS VAN DER STOEL'S SUGGESTION AT COPENHAGEN MINISTERIAL. WE NOTE THAT A CONSENSUS IN NATO FAVORING THIS APPROACH MAY BE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN AND THAT WE MAY HAVE TO FALL BACK TO A SOLUTION WHICH COVERS

INDIGENOUS AND ALLIED STATIONED FORCES MORE DEFINITELY.)

11. IN PRESENTING THE ABOVE PREFERENCE TO THE ALLIES, WE WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS:

A. OPTION II WOULD BE THE MOST HELPFUL TO THE U.S. IN RESPONDING TO CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES AND WOULD CONFORM TO THE ALLIES' GENERAL PREFERENCE THAT INITIAL REDUCTIONS FOCUS ON SOVIET AND U.S. FORCES.

B. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS COULD MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE, SINCE THIS PROPOSAL WOULD APPLY SYMMETRICALLY IN PERCENTAGE TERMS TO U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES, AND WOULD ENTAIL FEWER SOVIET TROOP REDUCTIONS THAN OPTION I.

C. IT WOULD POSE FEWER OBSTACLES DETERRING THE ALLIES FROM INCREASING THEIR CONVENTIONAL FORCE CAPABILITIES AND THEREBY WOULD NOT RAISE DOUBTS ABOUT ALLIED DETERMINATION TO MAKE THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE EFFECTIVE.

D. IT WOULD NOT RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATION OF NATO'S MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND WOULD BE LESS DISADVANTAGEOUS MILITARILY THAN REDUCING INDIGENOUS FORCES.

E. WHILE PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS FOR A PROMPT REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN THE INITIAL STAGE, IT WOULD GIVE THE ALLIES TIME TO CONSIDER MORE CAREFULLY THE COMPLEX ISSUES INVOLVED IN SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION PHASES, INCLUDING THE POSSIBLE EFFECT ON NATO'S MILITARY POSTURE.

PART III: NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

12. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS SECTION SHOULD GO INTO EXCESSIVE DETAIL ON TACTICS, WHICH CAN BETTER BE RESOLVED AMONG ALLIED NEGOTIATORS AT THE SITE. WE DO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, HOWEVER, FOR THE ALLIES TO AGREE IN NATO ON THEIR BASIC STRATEGY
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 03266 02 OF 02 101705Z

FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. (COMMENT: "NEGOTIATING STRATEGY" COULD ALSO INCLUDE, OF COURSE, THE QUESTION OF WORKING GROUPS, EMISSARIES, ETC., BUT, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE BELGIANS PLAN TO TIE THE QUESTION TO ALLIED COORDINATION POLICY (USNATO 3133), WE SUGGEST KEEPING IT IN THAT SEPARATE CONTEXT. END COMMENT). THE PRINCIPAL HEADINGS AND SUBSTANTIVE POINTS WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE INCLUDED IN THIS SECTION ARE THE FOLLOWING:

A. ORDER OF BUSINESS. THE ALLIES MIGHT AGREE IN ADVANCE TO THEIR PREFERRED SCENARIO FOR THE OPENING DISCUSSIONS. IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL, FOR EXAMPLE, TO HAVE A PRIOR UNDERSTANDING ON THE ALLIES BASIC APPROACH TO OPENING STATEMENTS, TO THE FINAL RESOLUTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS, AND TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS OF THE AGENDA.

B. TABLING OF INITIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. THE U.S. PAPER MIGHT PROPOSE THAT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE ALLIES SHOULD PLAN TO TABLE BEFORE THE END OF 1973 THEIR INITIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL FOR THE FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS.

THE U.S. PAPER SHOULD ALSO FLAG HERE THE FACT THAT THE ALLIES

WILL HAVE TO BEAR IN MIND THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CBM'S IN THE CSCE CONTEXT AND PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINTS IN THE MBFR CONTEXT, BUT NOTE THAT THIS QUESTION CAN BE ADDRESSED LATER IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BOTH CONFERENCES. (THE QUESTION OF WHO TABLES THE INITIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL AND WHETHER IT IS TABLED IN WHOLE OR PIECEMEAL CAN BEST BE RESOLVED BY THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS IN LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION).

C. SUBSEQUENT PHASES. THIS SUB-SECTION WOULD BE THE PLACE TO REGISTER ALLIED DIFFERENCES ON SUBSEQUENT PHASES AND TO SEEK AN AGREED TACTICAL LINE ON RESPONDING TO SOVIET SUGGESTIONS THAT STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES BE CLOSELY LINKED. WASHINGTON SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER, IN RETURN FOR AN ALLIED COMMITMENT TO HOLD TO THE POSITION THAT THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD CONSIST ONLY OF U.S. AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS, THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT EITHER A FREEZE ON INDIGENOUS FORCES AND OR A FORMAL AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO SUBSEQUENT REDUCTION PHASES. WE SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED TO STATE THAT WE WILL JOIN THE ALLIES IN STUDYING IN NATO POSSIBLE EVENTUAL PROPOSALS FOR A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS, FOR EXAMPLE A MIXED PACKAGE REDUCTION, FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF STATIONED FORCES OR INDIGENOUS FORCE REDUCTIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 03266 02 OF 02 101705Z

13. THIS SECTION COULD ALSO INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS AND THE ROLE OF OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES IN NEGOTIATIONS. ALTERNATIVELY, A PAPER ON THIS SUBJECT COULD BE ANNEXED AS A BACKGROUND PAPER. THE MISSION'S ONLY PREFERENCE IS THAT THIS NOT APPEAR IN SECTION 1, SINCE THIS COULD DELAY DISCUSSION OF AN INITIAL NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL.

14. AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD READ AND APPROVED THIS MESSAGE IN DRAFT BEFORE DEPARTING BRUSSELS.
MCAULIFFE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 02 APR 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 10 JUL 1973
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: boyleja
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973NATO03266
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19730767/abqcebcu.tel
Line Count: 310
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: boyleja
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 13 AUG 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <13-Aug-2001 by kellerpr>; APPROVED <20-Sep-2001 by boyleja>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SUBJECT MBFR: AN ALLIANCE PROGRAM FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO HELSINKI
USCINCEUR
ALL NATO CAPITALS
USNMR SHAPE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

